Controlling Proliferation
Nick Smith, November 14, 2004
Limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may well be the world’s most difficult and important problem in international relations. More and more rogue regimes, like North Korea and Iran, are seeking nuclear weapons. It’s like the Wild West, where small and aggressive countries try to look tough by strapping on their holsters and threatening each other (and the U.S.) with their nuclear revolvers.
Today, there are five countries that have declared their possession of nuclear weapons (the U.S., Great Britain, France, Russia, and China) and three more have undeclared possession (Israel, India, and Pakistan). This is considerably less than predicted 40 years ago, when President Kennedy warned of the possibility that the United States could "face a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons." However, the number is growing. North Korea is thought to possess enough plutonium to construct between two and eight weapons and Iran is actively seeking to refine uranium for weapons. In addition, it is thought that nearly all industrial nations have latent capacity to quickly develop nuclear weapons should they feel the need to do so.
The technology behind the construction of nuclear weapons, though revolutionary when the U.S. built the first ones in 1945, is now fairly primitive. Graduate students studying physics in American universities have been able to design viable weapons, meaning that nearly any country can develop a workable blueprint. The more difficult problem is procuring sufficient plutonium or enriched uranium to fuel the weapon. Plutonium does not occur naturally and must be collected from operating nuclear reactors. Uranium occurs naturally, but must be refined to increase the presence of a certain isotope (U-235) to be useful for a weapon.
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed in 1970 to deal with the problem. Non-nuclear countries joined by agreeing not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There are now 187 parties to the NPT, but North Korea withdrew from the treaty officially in April 2003. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verifies compliance using a system of nuclear material accountancy coupled with periodic and special inspections to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses to military uses.
The problem is figuring out what to do when this system breaks down. Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Africa have all become nuclear powers in violation of this treaty (although South Africa subsequently gave up its nuclear capabilities). Now rogue states are increasingly seeking membership in the nuclear club. Iraq under Saddam Hussein was prevented from joining the nuclear club by the bombing of its reactor in 1981, and North Korea and Iran are now knocking on the door.
As a senior member of the International Relations Committee, I know there are no easy answers. It is not practical to use force, as we did in Iraq, to disarm every nuclear power. On the other hand, there must be a credible threat of force if negotiation with rogue regimes is going to work. The solution will require better intelligence to detect illicit nuclear programs, stricter international inspections, and stronger sanctions against NPT violators. Our security and that of our allies depends on finding the proper balance to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.
Congressman Nick Smith, a Republican, represents Michigan's 7th Congressional District, which includes Battle Creek and the counties of Branch, Eaton, Hillsdale, Jackson, Lenawee, Calhoun, and Washtenaw in south-central Michigan.
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