TruthNews Commentary, January 7, 2003

Perhaps the measure of a good compromise is how many people are unsatisfied with it. By this measure, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s proposal of "unilateral disengagement" from the Palestinians is the best compromise imaginable. Both the Israeli right and left have expressed their horror with what Sharon is proposing, the U.S. State Department is aghast, and the Palestinians are, well, as angry as ever.

In a nutshell, what Sharon has proposed is to complete the security fence to prevent Palestinian terrorist attacks, evacuate the isolated settlements that cannot be easily defended, formally annex the large settlements that will be within the protection of the security fence. To the Israeli right, which has long dreamed of keeping all of the historical land of Israel, this is not so much unilateral disengagement as unilateral surrender. To the Palestinians and the Israeli left, Sharon’s proposal represents a naked grab of Palestinian land -- according to the Jerusalem Post, only 53 percent of the disputed territories would be left to Palestinian rule, as compared to as much as 80 percent under the State Department’s "roadmap." To the State Department, of course, whose reason for being is negotiation, any unilateral solution is anathema -- implementation of "unilateral disengagement" would be the final nail in the coffin of their beloved roadmap.

But Sharon’s proposal represents not so much a strategy as a threat. He’s saying to the Palestinians, in effect, "return to the negotiating table or I’ll implement my own solution." This may be as empty a threat as the Israeli cabinet’s declaration that they were going to get rid of Palestinian terrorist leader Yasser Arafat. This was a compromise between those in the cabinet who wanted to get rid of Arafat and those who didn’t. Arafat still reigns in Ramallah, his promised removal has been forgotten, and his terrorist attacks continue.

Most of those on the Israeli right who oppose Sharon’s unilateral disengagement strategy serve in his cabinet, which has already accepted the State Department’s roadmap to peace (or where ever). The roadmap consisted in essence of three steps: 1) the Palestinians stop killing the Jews, 2) the Palestinians hold elections, and 3) the Palestinians get their own state. So far, the Palestinians have been unwilling to implement the first step, so a Palestinian state appears rather ephemeral at this point. But the question is, why did those on the Israeli right accept the roadmap, and the explicit promise of a Palestinian state, but oppose the idea of unilateral separation? The answer, of course, is that they never expected the Palestinians to get past the first step of the roadmap. This is similar to the Democrats in Congress who voted for the war with Iraq, but were shocked when President Bush actually carried out the war that they had voted for.

In some ways, Sharon’s unilateral disengagement strategy (which former Prime Minister Ehud Barak advocated under the name "unilateral withdrawal") has a certain attractiveness to it -- pull out of the disputed territories, wall them off, and let the terrorists stew in their own festering hatred. This is reminiscent of the movie "Escape from New York," which came out in 1981 and starred Kurt Russell. In the science fiction thriller, set in the not so distant future, New York has been walled off from the rest of America and is inhabited only by psychopaths, killers, and thugs. The movie was made before Rudy Giuliani cleaned up the city, so such a future did not seem unlikely.

But in the movie, the New Yorkers did not have long range artillery rockets that they could bombard Newark with. And therein lies the problem with unilateral disengagement. Building the security fence will help to reduce terrorism, but cannot by itself prevent terrorist attacks. Currently much of the border of the West Bank exists only as a line on a map. Roads are controlled, but a Palestinian suicide bomber can ride in a Palestinian ambulance to a point near the border, walk across a field, board an Israeli bus, and blow himself up (or ride to a restaurant in Tel Aviv or Haifa and blow himself up). There’s no reason to make it easy for terrorists, so the fence is an appropriate step. But airplanes and rockets can go over the fence, tunnels can go under, and bulldozers can go through, so there’s no reason to expect a fence to stop all terrorism. The fence will be patrolled and alarmed, of course, but terrorists operating from the disputed territories can still find ways to strike at Israel.

For this reason, unilateral disengagement is not a panacea. Settlers in the line of fire can be pulled back to regions of greater safety. But if the rockets start flying or planes start crashing into buildings, the Israeli army will find it necessary to reengage. And stealthier infiltration such as by tunneling will require even more active Israeli military action within the disputed territories.

Continued Israeli control of the Jordan valley and the border between the Gaza strip and Egypt will also be necessary to prevent the Palestinian terrorists from building up their arms. Both Egypt and Jordan are leading contenders to be the next Iran. In both countries, moderate dictators preside over increasingly radical populations. A single bullet in either country could result in a Khomeini clone taking over, so continued border control may be even more necessary in the future.

Of course, Israeli military action within the Palestinian areas will lead to the usual ritual condemnation by the UN and EU and the increasing isolation of Israel by the world. The plight of the Palestinian people under what will amount to blockade will continue to be exploited by Arab dictators eager to divert public attention from their own shortcomings. And the situation will remain a festering sore inviting international intervention. That’s why unilateral disengagement may be better as a threat than as a strategy.