Washington File, August 28, 2003

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board has determined that physical and organizational causes played equal roles in the loss of the space shuttle Columbia and seven astronauts on February 1.

The 13-member board, which on August 26 released its 248-page final report on the causes of the shuttle accident, also concluded that while the present space shuttle system of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is not "inherently unsafe," a number of mechanical fixes are required to make the shuttle safer in the short-term.

Officials determined months ago that a chunk of foam insulation that struck and damaged the leading edge of Columbia's left wing during its launch on January 16 was the direct physical cause of damage to the shuttle that led to its disintegration upon re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere.

The investigation board, citing disturbing "echoes" of the shuttle Challenger disaster of 1986, said it was convinced that the management practices followed in overseeing the space shuttle program "were as much a cause of the (Columbia) accident as the foam that struck the left wing." It concludes that NASA's current organization "does not provide effective checks and balances, does not have an independent safety program, and has not demonstrated the characteristics of a learning organization."

The board also said that, during Columbia's last mission, NASA managers missed opportunities to evaluate possible damage to the left wing's heat shield from the flying foam insulation. Such insulation strikes had occurred on previous missions and the report said NASA managers had come to view them as an acceptable abnormality that posed no safety risk.

"Perhaps most striking is the fact that management ... displayed no interest in understanding a problem and its implications," the report said.

The board makes 29 recommendations, including steps necessary before the shuttle flies again and those needed to make the shuttle inherently safer in the longer term. But the board adds that based on NASA's history of ignoring external recommendations or making improvements that atrophy with time, it has "no confidence that the space shuttle can be safely operated for more than a few years based solely on renewed post-accident vigilance." The board said "The changes we recommend will be difficult to accomplish -- and will be internally resisted."

The board said NASA's failings were due in part to a lean budget and other pressures, such as the need to build an international space station, and called for a national debate about the future of human space flight.

President Bush, in a statement released August 26, said the next steps for NASA would be determined after a review of the entire report, including its recommendations. "Our journey into space will go on," he said. "The work of the crew of the Columbia and the heroic explorers who traveled before them will continue."